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NO ROOM LEFT FOR DOUBT: 





Recent release orders, statements by some military lawyers and judges, and the military’s 
own admission of detention mistakes all confirm that the only way for the Obama 
administration to restore our legal system’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world will be to 
close down Guantánamo, scrap the ill-conceived military commissions, and charge in 
federal court those prisoners we think committed crimes.... 
 
More revelations about the illegitimacy of the Bush administration’s war-on-terror 
detention system have cascaded into the public consciousness this week. This new round 
of disclosures and court decisions should give pause to those who have joined the 
fashionable call for creation of new “national security courts.” We now have a critical 
mass of information from military insiders about detainee abuse and procedural 
irregularities at Guantánamo, removing all doubt about our need to treat our detainee 
population in the civilian justice system. 
 
The news from Guantánamo has been relentless. A military official, for the first time, 
confirmed on the record that we have straight-up “tortured” prisoners at Guantánamo. A 
federal judge, infamous in some circles for his hostility to the Guantánamo prisoners’ 
legal arguments, ordered the release of his sixth habeas petitioner in a month. After 
nearly seven years in detention, another Guantánamo prisoner was determined by the 
military itself to have been wrongly labeled an enemy combatant. And, most stunningly, 
a military prosecutor detailed in court papers the utter disarray that grips the office of the 
military commissions, and declared there was no way for the system to provide fair trials 
to Guantánamo prisoners. 
 
By far, the splashiest news of the week was made by Judge Susan J. Crawford, 
“convening authority” of the military commissions, who told the Washington Post’s Bob 
Woodward that she refused to allow the prosecution of at least one Guantánamo prisoner 
because “we tortured him.”[1] The Post noted that the prisoner, Mohammed al-Qahtani, 
was threatened with a military working dog, forced to wear women's underclothing, led 
around on a leash and made to perform dog tricks, told that his mother and sisters were 
whores, and subjected to 18-to-20 hour interrogations for 48 of 54 consecutive days, 
sometimes while standing naked in front of a female agent. Once during this period, 
Qahtani’s heart rate dropped to 35 beats per minute, and he was taken to the camp 
hospital to prevent total heart failure.[2] 
 
While we have known about Qahtani’s treatment since the Spring of 2006, what is new is 
an administration official conceding that this treatment “met the legal definition of 
torture,” and candidly acknowledging that testimony coerced out of a prisoner in this 
manner cannot, consistent with the rule of law, be allowed into evidence against him. 
Unremarked by the Post article, however, is that Judge Crawford’s observations about 
this one prisoner go a long way toward undermining the legality of detentions far beyond 
Qahtani’s. Statements made by Qahtani, after all, have been used to justify the detentions 
of perhaps scores of men at Guantánamo. Indeed, in a press release issued by the 
Pentagon in June 2005, authorities bragged that Qahtani was the primary source for the 
military’s conclusion that another 30 prisoners at Guantánamo were affiliated with al 
Qaeda.[3] 
 
We habeas lawyers have been saying for years that the evidence - including, for example, 
coerced statements from Guantánamo prisoners like Qahtani - against our clients is 
tainted and unreliable. But it is only in the past few weeks that federal judges have 
overwhelmingly confirmed our assertions. Judge Richard J. Leon, of the federal district 
court in D.C., for example, ordered the release of petitioner Mohammed el Gharani, a 
Chadian national who was only 14 when he was taken into custody. This decision may 
strike some as remarkable, since Judge Leon's history with the Guantánamo cases 
suggests he would be hostile to the claims of the petitioners before him. In January 2005, 
he had held that the Guantánamo prisoners had no constitutional rights and that they were 
therefore not entitled to habeas hearings at all. 
 
Nonetheless, since June 2008, when the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that 
the prisoners could pursue their habeas claims,[4] Judge Leon has granted the writ and 
ordered the release of prisoners in six out of seven cases before him. In Gharani, Judge 
Leon was particularly scathing in his analysis of the government’s evidence against the 
petitioner, noting that most of the allegations were made up of statements by fellow 
prisoners whose credibility the government itself had called into question. The 
government case, according to the judge, was “a mosaic of tiles bearing images” that 
were so “murky” as to reveal “nothing about the petitioner with sufficient clarity, either 
individually or collectively, that can be relied upon by this Court.”[5] 
 
Just a few months earlier, in October 2008, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina had ordered the 
release of 17 Uighur prisoners into the United States after the government conceded that 
they were not enemy combatants.[6] So, for those keeping track, Judge Leon’s decision 
this week makes the habeas litigation scorecard 23 to 3, in favor of the Guantánamo 
prisoners. If you add in the military’s own admission last week that Haji Bismullah has 
been wrongly detained as an “enemy combatant” since 2003 [7], then the Guantánamo 
prisoners are up 24 to 3, or three touchdowns over the government. 
 
The most remarkable news of the week, however, has so far gotten the least attention in 
the press. Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld, a military lawyer who was detailed to 
prosecute Guantánamo prisoner Mohammed Jawad, filed a declaration in support of 
Jawad’s habeas corpus petition. All of the alleged evidence against Jawad, Vandeveld 
told the court, was either unreliable, coerced, nonexistent, or missing. In addition, 
Vandeveld told the court that he was certain Jawad had been abused while in U.S. 
custody. 
 
Vandeveld’s turnaround is as remarkable as last year’s principled resignation of Colonel 
Morris Davis, who had served as the chief prosecutor - and de facto Bush administration 
spokesman - for the military commissions at Guantánamo. Colonel Davis, an unlikely 
critic of commissions system, resigned his position after citing political interference with 
the independence of his office. “As things stand right now,” he said at the time, “I think 
it's a disgrace to call it a military commission – it’s a political commission.” 
 
Vandeveld now joins Davis and a growing number of military lawyers who have gone 
public about abuses in the Guantánamo system. Lieutenant Colonel V. Stuart Couch, for 
instance, resigned as a prosecutor in May 2004 after concluding that Mohamedou Ould 
Slahi, the man he was supposed to put on trial, had indisputably been tortured. Lieutenant 
Colonel Stephen Abraham, who served on the military’s “Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals,” filed an affidavit in the summer of 2007 in the Supreme Court in the 
Boumediene case, describing the manner in which these administrative proceedings were 
rigged against the prisoners. And Lieutenant Colonel Colby Vokey, the Marine Corps’ 
chief of all defense lawyers for the western U.S., announced his resignation last year 
because military staff had harassed him and interfered with his defense work for a 
juvenile prisoner at the camp. Vokey called the legal system at Guantánamo 
“disgraceful” and a “sham,” warning that “anytime you want to subvert the rule of law to 
the power of a government, you’ve got a very bad thing brewing.” 
 
But the Vandeveld defection, and particularly his declaration in the Jawad habeas case, 
are unique because of the detailed description he provides of the chaos that rules within 
the Guantánamo prosecutors’ office, and the corresponding impossibility of providing 
detainees with a fair hearing in a military commission. 
 
In his declaration, Vandeveld describes himself as, initially, a true believer in the military 
commissions process, convinced that the man he was tasked to prosecute was a war 
criminal who had confessed to attacking two U.S. soldiers with a hand grenade.[8] What 
he learned as he tried to put together his case, however, was that any presumption of 
regularity in the gathering of evidence against Jawad was unmerited. After a fact-finding 
trip to Afghanistan, for example, Vandeveld began to suspect that Jawad’s alleged 
confession to Pakistani police was coerced. His suspicions were confirmed when he 
learned that Jawad’s “confession” (which the U.S. military has relied on to justify his 
detention) was written in a language he did not speak, that Jawad was functionally 
illiterate at any rate, and that the thumb print which supposedly verified the confession as 
his own was not even his own thumbprint. 
 
Vandeveld, who had been informed there was a videotape of the grenade attack, was also 
stunned to learn that the tape had disappeared, and that no one in the Criminal 
Investigative Task Force (CITF) could locate it. He learned, moreover, that neither CITF 
nor the Office of Military Commissions (OMC) maintained a central repository for case 
files, and that the evidence, “such as it was,” was “scattered throughout an 
incomprehensible labyrinth of databases,” or “strewn throughout the prosecution offices 
in desk drawers, bookcases …, or even simply piled on the tops of desks vacated by 
prosecutors who had departed the Commissions for other assignments.” At one point, 
after many months of searching, Vandeveld was able to locate some of his case 
documents - including discovery information to which Jawad’s defense was entitled - in a 
locker whose contents had been forgotten at Guantánamo. 
 
His declaration also describes Vandeveld’s initial dismissal, in open court, of Jawad’s 
allegations of abuse as exaggerations - along with his gradual realization that Jawad had 
indeed been abused while in U.S. custody. Vandeveld came across documents proving 
that, while at Bagram, Jawad was shoved down a stairwell while hooded and shackled. 
He learned that a Behavioral Science Consultation Team psychologist had prepared a 
psychological assessment of Jawad’s mental condition in order to assist interrogators in 
extracting information from him. He uncovered documents proving that the military had 
carried out a systematic program of sleep deprivation on Jawad, moving him from cell to 
cell 112 times during a two week period. These same documents revealed that Jawad 
attempted suicide at least once by banging his head repeatedly against his cell wall. 
 
In the end, Vandeveld says he became “utterly convinced,” because of the chaotic state of 
the evidence maintained by CITF and OMC, that he could not comply with his 
professional obligations to turn over discovery materials to the defense. He also 
concluded that no Commissions prosecutor could do so consistent with professional 
obligations. Coupled with “unnecessary restrictions imposed under the guise of national 
security,” it is “impossible for anyone involved (the prosecutors) or caught up (the 
detainees) in the Commissions to harbor even the remotest hope that justice is an 
achievable goal.” 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld’s declaration, Judge Leon’s release orders, Judge 
Crawford’s plain talk about torture, and the military’s own admission of detention 
mistakes, all confirm that the only way for the Obama administration to restore our legal 
system’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world will be to close down Guantánamo, scrap the 
ill-conceived military commissions, and charge in federal court those prisoners we think 
committed crimes. Our experiment with new courts and untested procedures has been a 
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